What role does the Hadamard transformation play in the BB84 protocol, and how does it affect the qubits sent from Alice to Bob?

/ / Published in Cybersecurity, EITC/IS/QCF Quantum Cryptography Fundamentals, Security of Quantum Key Distribution, Security of BB84, Examination review

The Hadamard transformation, often referred to as the Hadamard gate in the context of quantum computing, is a fundamental quantum operation that plays a important role in the BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. The BB84 protocol, named after its inventors Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984, is one of the first and most widely studied quantum cryptographic protocols designed to enable two parties, commonly referred to as Alice and Bob, to securely share a cryptographic key.

The Hadamard transformation is a single-qubit operation that creates a superposition state from a computational basis state. Mathematically, the Hadamard gate H acts on a qubit in the state |0⟩ or |1⟩ as follows:

    \[ H|0⟩ = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0⟩ + |1⟩) \]

    \[ H|1⟩ = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0⟩ - |1⟩) \]

These resulting states, \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0⟩ + |1⟩) and \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0⟩ - |1⟩), are known as the plus state |+⟩ and the minus state |−⟩, respectively. The Hadamard gate essentially transforms the computational basis states (|0⟩ and |1⟩) into the diagonal basis states (|+⟩ and |−⟩), and vice versa.

In the BB84 protocol, the Hadamard transformation is used to prepare and measure qubits in two different bases: the computational basis (also known as the rectilinear basis) and the diagonal basis. The protocol proceeds through several key steps, where the Hadamard transformation is integral to the process:

1. Preparation of Qubits by Alice:
Alice prepares a sequence of qubits in one of the two bases. She randomly chooses between the computational basis (|0⟩ and |1⟩) and the diagonal basis (|+⟩ and |−⟩). For instance, if she chooses the computational basis, she might prepare a qubit in the state |0⟩ or |1⟩. If she chooses the diagonal basis, she applies the Hadamard transformation to these states, resulting in the states |+⟩ or |−⟩.

2. Transmission of Qubits to Bob:
Alice sends the prepared qubits to Bob through a quantum channel. The qubits are in a superposition state, and their exact state depends on Alice's choice of basis and the random bit she wants to encode.

3. Measurement by Bob:
Upon receiving the qubits, Bob randomly chooses a basis (computational or diagonal) to measure each qubit. If Bob's chosen basis matches Alice's preparation basis, he will correctly measure the state of the qubit. If the bases do not match, Bob's measurement will yield a random result due to the principles of quantum mechanics.

4. Sifting Phase:
After the transmission and measurement, Alice and Bob communicate over a classical channel to reveal the bases they used for each qubit (but not the actual measurement results). They discard the qubits where their bases did not match. The remaining qubits, where the bases matched, form the raw key.

The Hadamard transformation's role in the BB84 protocol is pivotal because it ensures that the qubits are prepared and measured in two non-orthogonal bases. This property is essential for the security of the protocol because it guarantees that any eavesdropping attempt by an adversary (commonly referred to as Eve) will introduce detectable disturbances.

To illustrate this, consider the scenario where Eve tries to intercept and measure the qubits sent from Alice to Bob. If Eve measures the qubits in the wrong basis (i.e., a basis different from the one Alice used to prepare the qubit), she will collapse the qubit's state and introduce errors. When Bob later measures the same qubit, there is a 50% chance he will get a different result than he would have if Eve had not interfered. By comparing a subset of their results over the classical channel, Alice and Bob can detect the presence of an eavesdropper by observing an increased error rate.

For example, if Alice prepares a qubit in the state |+⟩ (using the Hadamard gate on |0⟩) and Eve measures it in the computational basis, she will obtain either |0⟩ or |1⟩ with equal probability. If Bob then measures the same qubit in the diagonal basis, he will get a random result because the qubit's state has been disturbed by Eve's measurement. This disturbance leads to discrepancies when Alice and Bob compare their results, revealing the presence of eavesdropping.

Furthermore, the Hadamard transformation's ability to create superposition states is a manifestation of the core quantum mechanical principle of superposition, which is essential for the security of BB84. The non-commutativity of measurements in different bases (i.e., measuring in the computational basis versus the diagonal basis) ensures that any attempt to gain information about the key without being detected will inevitably introduce errors.

In addition to its role in preparing and measuring qubits in different bases, the Hadamard transformation also contributes to the protocol's robustness against various types of attacks. For instance, in the presence of noise or imperfect quantum channels, the use of two bases helps mitigate the impact of errors and allows for error correction and privacy amplification techniques to be effectively applied.

The Hadamard transformation is a fundamental component of the BB84 protocol, enabling the preparation and measurement of qubits in two non-orthogonal bases. This property is important for the security of the protocol, as it ensures that any eavesdropping attempt will introduce detectable disturbances, allowing Alice and Bob to identify and mitigate potential security threats. The Hadamard transformation's role in creating superposition states and its contribution to the protocol's robustness against noise and attacks underscore its significance in the field of quantum cryptography.

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