To find the period in Shor’s Quantum Factoring Algorithm we repeat the circuit some times to get the samples for the GCD and then the period. How many samples do we need in general for that?
To determine the period in Shor's Quantum Factoring Algorithm, it is essential to repeat the circuit multiple times to obtain samples for finding the greatest common divisor (GCD) and subsequently the period. The number of samples required for this process is important for the algorithm's efficiency and accuracy. In general, the number of samples needed
Is the copying of the C(x) bits in contradiction with the no cloning theorem?
The no-cloning theorem in quantum mechanics states that it is impossible to create an exact copy of an arbitrary unknown quantum state. This theorem has significant implications for quantum information processing and quantum computation. In the context of reversible computation and the copying of bits represented by the function C(x), it is essential to understand
When a user consents for a list of labels how he can be assured that there are no additional ones that will be applied (e.g. consents is given for the mic access but the approval is used to give access to both the mic and the camera)?
In the realm of mobile app security, it is important for users to have confidence that their consent for a specific list of labels does not grant additional privileges beyond what they intend. This issue, known as consent misrepresentation, can potentially lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and compromise user privacy. To address this
Is there a security sevice that verifies that the receiver (Bob) is the right one and not someone else (Eve)?
In the field of cybersecurity, specifically in the realm of cryptography, there exists a problem of authentication, implemented for example as digital signatures, that can verify the identity of the receiver. Digital signatures provide a means to ensure that the intended recipient, in this case Bob, is indeed the correct individual and not someone else,
Is the exchange of keys in DHEC done over any kind of channel or over a secure channel?
In the field of cybersecurity, specifically in advanced classical cryptography, the exchange of keys in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is typically done over a secure channel rather than any kind of channel. The use of a secure channel ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged keys, which is important for the security of the
- Published in Cybersecurity, EITC/IS/ACC Advanced Classical Cryptography, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
In EC starting with a primitive element (x,y) with x,y integers we get all the elements as integers pairs. Is this a general feature of all ellipitic curves or only of the ones we choose to use?
In the realm of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), the property mentioned, where starting with a primitive element (x,y) with x and y as integers, all subsequent elements are also integer pairs, is not a general feature of all elliptic curves. Instead, it is a characteristic specific to certain types of elliptic curves that are chosen
- Published in Cybersecurity, EITC/IS/ACC Advanced Classical Cryptography, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
How are the standarized curves defined by NIST and are they public?
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) plays a important role in defining standardized curves for use in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). These standardized curves are publicly available and widely used in various cryptographic applications. Let us consider the process of how NIST defines these curves and discuss their public availability. NIST defines standardized
- Published in Cybersecurity, EITC/IS/ACC Advanced Classical Cryptography, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Introduction to elliptic curves
Is a collision possible on the calculation of ephemeral or masking keys, i.e. for two different messages there would be the same ephemeral or masking key?
In the Elgamal encryption scheme, the calculation of ephemeral or masking keys plays a important role in ensuring the security of the encryption process. It is essential to understand whether a collision is possible, i.e., whether two different messages can have the same ephemeral or masking key. To answer this question, we need to consider
- Published in Cybersecurity, EITC/IS/ACC Advanced Classical Cryptography, Encryption with Discrete Log Problem, Elgamal Encryption Scheme
Can we tell how many irreducible polynomial exist for GF(2^m) ?
In the field of classical cryptography, specifically in the context of the AES block cipher cryptosystem, the concept of Galois Fields (GF) plays a important role. Galois Fields are finite fields that are extensively used in cryptography for their mathematical properties. In this regard, GF(2^m) is of particular interest, where m represents the degree of
- Published in Cybersecurity, EITC/IS/CCF Classical Cryptography Fundamentals, AES block cipher cryptosystem, Introduction to Galois Fields for the AES
Can two different inputs x1, x2 produce the same output y in Data Encryption Standard (DES)?
In the Data Encryption Standard (DES) block cipher cryptosystem, it is theoretically possible for two different inputs, x1 and x2, to produce the same output, y. However, the probability of this occurring is extremely low, making it practically negligible. This property is known as a collision. DES operates on 64-bit blocks of data and uses
- Published in Cybersecurity, EITC/IS/CCF Classical Cryptography Fundamentals, DES block cipher cryptosystem, Data Encryption Standard (DES) - Key schedule and decryption
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